Interesting idea. It reminds me of Chalmers' speculation about a possible infinite regress of simulations that actually loop back into each other.
It seems like there are actually two type of relations here, containing and reference to. Under physicalism, the world contains the mind and the mind has references to the world. In (some forms of) idealism, the mind contains the world, but the world contains references to the mind.
But under some idealisms, there is a world out there outside of our own minds, just not a physical one, which complicates both the view you're describing and the ones I just described. For example, in subjective idealism, the world out there is within the mind of God, or a universal spirit of some kind. In that case, maybe the world contains *our* minds, but God's contains the world.
There's also the concept of recursion in computer science. Both the mind and world can self reference each other in self referencing loops. That seems to allow for a certain level of agnosticism about whether we're dealing with containment or reference.
That's interesting, I haven't heard of that idea from Chalmers. Is that in Reality+?
Good point about reference and containment. I think we can see it either way. We can see our experiences as inferences about the external world, which is kind of reference (or close enough). But then, we can also fairly talk about the contents of the world we infer. So it's both I'd say, and another good way of seeing how it is both internal and external.
I've been reading about Berkeley's idealism recently. It's very interesting how he was motivated largely by the desire to escape the kind of skepticism allowed for by the kind of dualist and indirect realist theories of the time.
It is in Reality+. Highly recommended. In the process of discussing simulations, he ends up covering a wide swath of philosophy. There are discussions of structural realism and functionalism, as well as criteria for existence and lots of other stuff. I did a series of posts on it a few years ago.
I haven't read about Berkeley's motivations, but the SEP article on Kant covers his motivations and they seemed to come from a similar place.
We are the paradox while simultaneously having the paradox, and somehow, I don't think that's a bad thing, or something we should X as a contradiction or whatever.
I can't look away!!
I enjoyed sitting with the discomfort of the premise, and then just like "that", it melted away, not in a "I've turned this inside-out" Wittgensteinian kind of way, but... well in some other way I can't quite describe right now
I've added Bacteria to Bach to my reading list and very much look forward to exploring whatever-this-is with great minds like yours. Thank you!
a genuine paradox wouldn’t depend on equivocating on “in” like you seem to be doing here. “French is one of the languages spoken in Quebec” has the word “French” literally in it, but what the sentence is about is a language, French, that isn’t literally in the English sentence. Even if we stipulated that the one-sentence “Word.” meant itself, that still wouldn’t be the unequivocal mutual containment your supposed paradox requires.
You might be right. Could you help clarify the way the senses of it are different? Mike Smith suggested containment and reference, with the mind referring to the world while the world contains the mind. But as I said to him, I think even if we think of our experiences as referring to/inferring things about the external world, there's still a sense in which that constitutes an inferred world containing things.
But "paradox" is probably slightly sloppy wording in any case. Klein bottles are cool and counterintuitive, but not strictly paradoxical.
the “in” in which anything is “in mind” or “in my thoughts and prayers” is a metaphorical application of the spatial preposition into contexts where you could swap it for other prepositions like “of” or “about”. Whether it’s always a matter of reference or intentionality is a technical philosophical question that will get answered in different technical ways by different philosophical theories. Certain qualia-lovin’ types will insist that the “of” in “experience of red” or “experience of a sunset” isn’t reference or spatial containment but some mysterious third thing. TLDR: No one knows; it’s all made up.
Would you say it's still a metaphorical application if it's in a mental space, like our experience of the external world's space? Or a simulated space on a computer?
Fair. Do you think physical space has something that makes it different from those virtual/metaphorical spaces? I think of space structurally, so anything which follows the same kind of structural rules is a space in the same way as physical space, even if those rules are embedded in a computer or a brain. Just wondering if you think of space in that way, and physical space is just not metaphorical because it's the OG space or higher level space, or if you think it has an extra property.
sure. for example, with real space, being inside is transititive. if you’re in new jersey and new jersey is in north America, then you’re in north america. but if george is thinking about mary, and mary is thinking about frogs, george need not be thinking about frogs 🐸
Interesting idea. It reminds me of Chalmers' speculation about a possible infinite regress of simulations that actually loop back into each other.
It seems like there are actually two type of relations here, containing and reference to. Under physicalism, the world contains the mind and the mind has references to the world. In (some forms of) idealism, the mind contains the world, but the world contains references to the mind.
But under some idealisms, there is a world out there outside of our own minds, just not a physical one, which complicates both the view you're describing and the ones I just described. For example, in subjective idealism, the world out there is within the mind of God, or a universal spirit of some kind. In that case, maybe the world contains *our* minds, but God's contains the world.
There's also the concept of recursion in computer science. Both the mind and world can self reference each other in self referencing loops. That seems to allow for a certain level of agnosticism about whether we're dealing with containment or reference.
That's interesting, I haven't heard of that idea from Chalmers. Is that in Reality+?
Good point about reference and containment. I think we can see it either way. We can see our experiences as inferences about the external world, which is kind of reference (or close enough). But then, we can also fairly talk about the contents of the world we infer. So it's both I'd say, and another good way of seeing how it is both internal and external.
I've been reading about Berkeley's idealism recently. It's very interesting how he was motivated largely by the desire to escape the kind of skepticism allowed for by the kind of dualist and indirect realist theories of the time.
It is in Reality+. Highly recommended. In the process of discussing simulations, he ends up covering a wide swath of philosophy. There are discussions of structural realism and functionalism, as well as criteria for existence and lots of other stuff. I did a series of posts on it a few years ago.
I haven't read about Berkeley's motivations, but the SEP article on Kant covers his motivations and they seemed to come from a similar place.
We are the paradox while simultaneously having the paradox, and somehow, I don't think that's a bad thing, or something we should X as a contradiction or whatever.
I can't look away!!
I enjoyed sitting with the discomfort of the premise, and then just like "that", it melted away, not in a "I've turned this inside-out" Wittgensteinian kind of way, but... well in some other way I can't quite describe right now
I've added Bacteria to Bach to my reading list and very much look forward to exploring whatever-this-is with great minds like yours. Thank you!
Thank you, glad you liked it! And yeah, it's a weird but kind of delightful thought 🙂.
Bacteria to Bach is one of my all time favourites, you're in for a treat!
yessir! tommy got me on Brainwise, dámaris got me Critique of Pure reason
gonna be a good year 👍🏻
I think a lot of philosophy is hunting for good analogies and this is a fantastic one.
Thank you!
Nicely done, Joseph.
Thank you!
a genuine paradox wouldn’t depend on equivocating on “in” like you seem to be doing here. “French is one of the languages spoken in Quebec” has the word “French” literally in it, but what the sentence is about is a language, French, that isn’t literally in the English sentence. Even if we stipulated that the one-sentence “Word.” meant itself, that still wouldn’t be the unequivocal mutual containment your supposed paradox requires.
You might be right. Could you help clarify the way the senses of it are different? Mike Smith suggested containment and reference, with the mind referring to the world while the world contains the mind. But as I said to him, I think even if we think of our experiences as referring to/inferring things about the external world, there's still a sense in which that constitutes an inferred world containing things.
But "paradox" is probably slightly sloppy wording in any case. Klein bottles are cool and counterintuitive, but not strictly paradoxical.
the “in” in which anything is “in mind” or “in my thoughts and prayers” is a metaphorical application of the spatial preposition into contexts where you could swap it for other prepositions like “of” or “about”. Whether it’s always a matter of reference or intentionality is a technical philosophical question that will get answered in different technical ways by different philosophical theories. Certain qualia-lovin’ types will insist that the “of” in “experience of red” or “experience of a sunset” isn’t reference or spatial containment but some mysterious third thing. TLDR: No one knows; it’s all made up.
Would you say it's still a metaphorical application if it's in a mental space, like our experience of the external world's space? Or a simulated space on a computer?
yes, i would, since those “spaces” are metaphorical spaces
Fair. Do you think physical space has something that makes it different from those virtual/metaphorical spaces? I think of space structurally, so anything which follows the same kind of structural rules is a space in the same way as physical space, even if those rules are embedded in a computer or a brain. Just wondering if you think of space in that way, and physical space is just not metaphorical because it's the OG space or higher level space, or if you think it has an extra property.
sure. for example, with real space, being inside is transititive. if you’re in new jersey and new jersey is in north America, then you’re in north america. but if george is thinking about mary, and mary is thinking about frogs, george need not be thinking about frogs 🐸
Beautiful article !
Thank you!